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Introduction
In any civilization, regardless of its state of industrialization, literacy,
and standard of living, disease" of the respiratory tract - 90% caused by
viruses - is overwhelmingly its most common health affliction. Our labora-
tory has been studying the epidemiology and transmission of respiratory
viruses since the early 1960's. The first studies were in a University of
Wisconsin housing village, Eagle Heights, where it was demonstrated that these
viruses pass through even small populations as very "mixed cultures"; within
one 12-unit apartment building, half a dozen different viruses could spread
simultaneously. Surprisingly, however, an individual virus often did not
transmit easily. Within a single family, only about 50% of the susceptibles
became infected with a single virus type, and the visas often did not move to
a neighboring apartment and very seldom to the apartments at the other end of
the building. Subsequently, we studied a second grade school population and
found, as well, that several viruses moved simultaneously and slowly through
this population.
We were very surprised that the viruses did not spread more readily, but
making definite conclusions about means of spread was hampered by the distinct
possibility that the several viruses in these open populations were, in
themselves, interfering with person-to-person transmission. (If one is
infected with one virus, it is often difficult to be infected with a second
virus, and sometimes this antiviral protection can last for a week or more.)
We then turned to human volunteer transmission studies wherein we infected one
or more individuals with a specific virus and then placed these infected
persons (donors) in rooms with other individuals (recipients) who had no
antibody to'this virus. The donors and recipients engaged in various inter-
active behaviors, e.g., playing cards, singing, working with TV games, etc.
Much to our amazement, virus transmission was nearly impossible even with
hours of exposure; transmission was really only readily accomplished when
married couples were the donor-recipient pair. Even here, transmission
occurred in only one-third of the couples. (A 1976 Reprint [@I] describing
our married couple study is enclosed.)
These studies with volunteers were consonant with our prior epidemiologic
studies. We felt that all our results suggested strongly t_at respiratory
viruses often disseminated with difficulty and therefore might be kept from
spreading by use of increased personal sanitation. We attempted to test this
hypothesis using the married couples as a transmission model and iodinated
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2facial tissues as the sanitary agent. Unfortunately, the married couple model
proved to be so uncertain a transmission vehicle that it could not serve its
purpose as a transmission model.
In the spring of 1975, I had the great good fortune to meet Dr. Harold
Muchmore of the Oklahoma State Medical School who was also a pre-eminent
Antarctic epidemiologist. He explained to me how the personnel at McMurdo
station, especially during the winter fly-in (Winfly) period, could serve as
an isolated population where few viruses were present and their natural
progress could be followed in detail within a group of approximately 200. At
Winfly 1975, using Dr. Muchmore's NSF logistics support and our NASA grants
(much of the human volunteer work had actually been supported by NASA), a
young Oklahoma State medical s£udent and I went to McMurdo to determine the
feasibility of assaying the epidemiology of the respiratory viruses in the
population. We found the Antarcticans to be very well motivated and it was
actually possible to carry out a fairly thorough epidemiologic study during
Winfly 1975. A by-product of that investigation was our first inkling that
the winter-over (WO) population was not especially susceptible to respiratory
disease. We returned to the United States very enthusiastic about the
possibility of doing definitive studies of interpersonal virus transmission
at McMurdo Station and, possibly, interrupting transmission in the population.
Before I launch into a description of our work at McMurdo Station and the
derivative development of a human volunteer transmission model, The Antarctic
Hut, it may be useful to introduce the audience to the jumble of respiratory
viruses.
Slide i - The respiratory viruses. This illustration depicts the seven
different virus groups which cause respiratory infections. Each of these
groups has subsidiary members which are antigenically distinct; none of these
135+ viruses yields any cross immunity to one another. Each of the viruses is
able to cause everything from a common cold to severe influenza ann pneumonia.
However, influenza viruses are much more likely to cause severe illnesses than
are the coronaviruses or the rhinoviruses. The latter two viruses are usually
called the "common cold viruses" with the rhinoviruses far in predominance.
Herpes simplex was not listed; it also can cause colds and a rather severe
sore throat. It is the same organism which can cause sexually transmitted
diseases and has done so in epidemic form over the past 15 years or so.
Slide 2 Epidemic curve of viruses in a 25-family population. In order to
illustrate how viruses move in clusters through a small population, depicted
is an epidemic curve for the academic year 1964-65 in 25 families we studied
at Eagle Heights, the UW student housing village. All 25 families were housed
in one three-building group of 12-unit apartments. The population was
approximately 100, with half of them children of school and pre-school age.
This 1964-65 epidemic curve is very typical of any year, with the parainflu-
enza viruses in late fall, followed by winter with a mixture of several
viruses (influenza, parainfluenza i, respiratory syncytial virus, etc.) and
spring with a rhinovirus outbreak. A somewhat similar distribution will be
seen each year in nearly any population in developed countries, at least in
the northern hemisphere.
Slide 3 - Respiratory viruses in a single Eagle Heights building. This slide
illustrates the 15 viruses which infected 12 families within a single Eagle
Heights building over 1963-65. You will note that there are several viruses
which were not listed in the previous 1964-65 slide; this illustrates the
changing mix of viruses that passes through populations in sequential years.
These two foregoing slides also illustrate well the near impossibility of syn-
thesizing a vaccine for protection against all the respiratory viruses and, as
well, the similarly great difficulty in developing antiviral drugs for these
varied and ubiquitous agents. Currently, we have only influenza vaccine which
is not very effective, and, as an antiviral, amantadine which is a fair
preventive against influenza A. Nothing else is available. The sheer
technical difficulty of coping'with 135+ viruses by conventional vaccine and
antiviral drug techniques makes environmental control of virus transmission
probably the only practical method for eliminating virus infections in any
population, including those projected for planetary colonies.
EpidemioloKy in Antarctica
Slide 4 - Antarctic research seasons at McMurdo. During our McMurdo studies
(1976-80), 50-70 persons wintered over, and, at the beginning of Winfly,
approximately 150 new persons from the United States and New Zealand joined
the WO party. The duration of Winfly is approximately five weeks and is
succeeded in early October by the vanguard of the summer researchers. During
the Austral summer there are frequent flights between McMurdo Station and
Christchurch, New Zealand, so the population is no longer very isolated.
Slide 5 Map of McMurdo Station. McMurdo Station is a substantial village
with: a major dormitory (Building 155) which houses most of the Winfly
residents and contains the kitchen and mess hall, a modern dispensary and
small hospital (Building 142), an electricity generating plant (Building 136),
a firehouse (Building 182), the biology laboratory (Building 56), which
contained our virus units, other dormitories (Buildings 125 and 137), and NSF
headquarters (Building 167). During the summer research season, this complex
of buildings can house and occupy up to 1,000 individuals.
Slides 6-17 - These were all McMurdo Station scenery slides which are familiar
to most of you, and, therefore, add little to the scientific narrative. They
are not included.
Slide 18 - The evening meal at the Building 155 mess hall. About 90% of the
population took all three meals in this dining area; the remainder ate at
separate kitchens in the firehouse or at the power plant, or, occasionally, in
their individual housing quarters.
Slide 19 - The mess line at the Building 155 dining facility. Since 90% of the
population ate at the Building 155 mess facility, this was a very convenient
place to conduct surveillance for respiratory disease. The men were asked
about their colds every day, and those who had colds were cultured in the
dispensary across from the messhall. The resultant nasal washings were
inoculated within hours into cell culture in the nearby biology building. We
equipped its microbiology laboratory for virus work without difficulty. The
biology building was very uncrowdedduring Winfly with good microbiological
facilities including research microscopes. (I presumethat the newmicrobiol-
ogy building under construction will have an excellent virus facility able to
handle the virology envisioned with the NASA/NSF Antarctic analog program.)
Slide 20 - Dr. Adrian Mandel interviewin_ a Navy man in the Buildin_ 155 mess
line. This is a close-up of our interviewing process in the McMurdo mess
line. I wish to call particular attention to Dr. Mandel. For about 15 years
(1965-80), our research was partially funded from NASA/AMES, and Dr. Mandel
was my project officer. He went with us during Winf!y of 1976 and 1977. He
is, by training, a bacteriologist and performed an outstanding and quite
heroic job in those two years. He was then in his late 50's and uncomplain-
ingly put in the terribly long hours required. He was outstanding with the
McMurdo personnel, had superb aseptic technique in the laboratory and was as
skilled at veni-puncture as anyone whom I have met. We were very grateful to
NASA for permitting him to join us for those two very important years. I
understand that he has just retired from his position at Ames; l'm sorry that
I wasn't able to add my accolades at his retirement celebration.
Slide 21 - The epidemic curve of respiratory virus disease at McMurdo Station_
Winfly 1976. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first successful
epidemiologic and etiologic surveillance of an isolated population using
modern virologic techniques. (A Reprint [#2] describing this investigation is
enclosed.) Respiratory illnesses, as usual, move very slowly. Counting five
indigenous colds reported by the WO population (we have never isolated viruses
from.colds reported by the winter-over personnel at the beginning of winter
fly-in, so we are somewhat suspicious of the authenticity of these indigenous
colds) as well as 31 colds brought in by the newcomers at the beginning of
Winfly, the 200 person population started with a total of 36 colds. These
initial colds gave rise to only 52 subsequent colds over the five-week Winfly
period. About 1% of the population reported new colds each day. In mid-
September, the colds peaked at 30 in 200 men.
Interestingly, there were really two epidemic curves, one for the new (summer)
population and the other for those who had wintered-over. This is best
illustrated on Figure 5 on p. 327 in Reprint #2. The newcomers began with
about 20% of the population infected, and at the end of Winfly this had
diminished to 5%. Conversely, the WO men started out at 5% and ended up at
10-15% The curve in the WO population is certainly explainable in that these
men were Just being exposed to a new group of viruses, but that in the summer
men does not seem to be obviously explicable. At the end of Winfly, the major
virus isolated, McMurdo 88 (McM 88), had plenty of susceptibles left to infect
in the summer men; only 19 of 78 summer men without McM 88 antibody became
infected (see table 5 on p. 330 in Reprint #2).
In great contrast to our expectations, there was no severe outbreak of disease
in the WO personnel.
Only two virus types were isolated, both of them non-typable rhinoviruses.
For reasons we do not understand, only McM88 was transmitted widely, account-
ing for 25 of the 88 colds. At the time of the greatest number of colds, mid-
September, around 15 of the 30 were associated definitely with McM88.
(Should it interest the reader, at the end of Reprint @2, under Conclusions
and Extrapolations (pp. 338-339), I have summarized what I feel to be the sig-
nificance of this McMurdo investigation and have tried to place it in the
context of our other work, including our subsequent "Antarctic Hut" experi-
ments.)
Slide 22 - Epidemic curve during Winfly_ 1977. Our overall findings in 1977
were very similar to those of 1976, including a ve__rvslow rate of virus spread
and no difference between the'WO and summer men in incidence or severity of
illness. (A Preprint [#3] of a publication which will appear in the March,
1991 issue of the American Journal of Epidemiolo_y is enclosed.) There were
also two interesting new observations: (I) although rhinoviruses were present
as well, adenovirus type 21 (Ad21) was predominant. This virus often causes
epidemics of rather severe influenza-like illness in susceptible military
populations. At McMurdo, the Ad21 patients were rather severely ill with
influenza-like symptoms, but the spread of this agent through the population
was extremely slow. This was especially peculiar in that the hallmark of Ad21
illness is a lasting, severe cough, which should hasten spread. This charac-
teristic cough was present in this population. We do not know why the Ad21
did not spread rapidly; perhaps there were not enough initial cases (only 3)
or the population was too dispersed. The ventilation i__ssexcellent in Building
155, the major housing and dining quarters. The presence of antibody in the
population did not account for the slow spread, as approximately 89% of the
population had no Ad21 antibody. (2) Those individuals who had jobs which
kept them outdoors in unheated (-30 ° C.) circumstances, day after day, had a
high rate of Ad21 infections. They had an attack rate of 57%, compared with 8%
in those men who worked in indoor environments. The difference was statisti-
cally highly significant (< 0.001). This unusual circumstance is described by
Dr. Shult on pages Ii and 12 of Preprlnt @3 and is discussed on pages 15 and
16. While there were possible confounding factors in this unusual outbreak,
this observation needs to be examined in a more controlled circumstance. It
would be interesting to move our Antarctic Hut model down to McMurdo Station
and use as =ecipients some of the frigid outdoor workers and compare, in the
same experiment, some of the men with indoor jobs. Maybe it is not a good
idea to become chilled when cold viruses are circulatingl The effect of
chilling on colds has been examined by prior investigators in human volunteer
models, and nothing positive has emerged. However, those experiments did not
subject the volunteers to anything like the severe environment to which these
men were subjected at McMurdo Station. Most of these very cold men were
equipment operators in unheated cabs working out at Williams Field, or the
fuel suppliers who also spent much time outside.
Slide 23 - Building 137_ a small dormitory. This demonstrates the external
structure of a small dormitory, which is very similar to the dormitory
building next door, Building 125, in which we did the following intensive
epidemiologic study.
Slide 24 - Rate of colds and of McMurdo 88 colds in four McMurdo Station
(This is Figure 7 on p. 332 of Reprint @2.) Note that the
occupants of two small buildings (125 and 136) have much higher illness attack
rates, both of colds in general and of McM 88 in particular, than the resi-
dents of Building 155. We studied Building 136 and 125 intensively, but
Building 125 was more of a viral "pure culture" and made for easier analysis.
(In Reprint #2, illness and virus movement in Buildings 136 and 125 are
depicted on Figures 8 and 9.) We do not know positively why the attack rates
were higher in the two smaller dormitories, but the population was much less
dense in Building 155, and, as well, Building 155 had an extremely good
ventilation system, using a significant portion of outside air. Buildings 136
and 125 recirculated the air.
Slide 25 - Dissemination of Rhinovirus McMurdo 88 in Buildin_ 125. Fourteen
men lived in Building 125, all of them employees of Holmes and Narver, the
civilian contractor at McMurdo Station. They slept in nine small bunk rooms
and, as well, had a small day room where many evenings were spent playing
cards or engaging in other convivialities. The great majority of these men
were skilled tradesmen and very gregarious. Of the 14 occupants, only one,
Person K, had antibody to McM 88 (surprisingly, he became infected). All but
two of the colds were diignosable in that we obtained acute and convalescent
serum specimens appropriate for measuring seroconversion to McM 88. There
were, in all, five McM 88 infections in the building, one of them (subject AA)
being subclinical. The cold in subject V was a severe incoming cold, and the
subsequent McM 88 colds were of varying severity, but all were typical cold-
like illnesses. (See Reprint @2, figure 6, p. 329 for cold severity of each
McM 88 case; a mild cold is less than 7, moderate 7-12, severe, greater than
12.) The last McM 88 cold was in subject K, whose cold began on September 13.
theseAt this ti=e, there were four active McM 88 infections among i4 men, but
no further infections were reported. Five individuais reported no colds, and
they did not seroconvert to McM 88, indicating that they were probably not
subc!inica!ly infected with this virus. This attack rate within this family-
like popUia£ion was much like that in the normal families we had studied in
Wisconsin - around 50%.
The low attack rate among the Building 125 population was of particular
interest, because we watched all the possible "cold-spreading" circumstances
in which these men lived. It seemed astounding that dissemination was so low.
When we returned to Wisconsin, I found a 1976 publication by members of Great
Britain's famous Common Cold Unit at Salisbury which set me to thinking about
the men in Building 125. The English had obtained nearly 100% transmission of
Rhlnovirus type 2 among human volunteers in British Antarctica. The colds
were also very severe. These Antarctic colds were compared with simultane-
ously-induced Rhinovirus 2 colds back in England, and the latter colds were
much milder and did not spread at all. These investigators ascribed the
severe colds and high transmission in Antarctica to a special sensitivity to
respiratory viruses among the Antarctic volunteers who had wintered over.
Since we had not found any particular susceptibility among the WO men at
McMurdo, I suspected that the high transmissiQp in the Antarctic was due to
crowding, poor ventilation and the severe illnesses in the persons inoculated
with Rhinovlrus type 2. (Our discussion of this outbreak in British Antarc-
tica can be found on pp. 334-336 in Reprint #2.) We surmised that, had we had
several severe colds in the Building 125 population, there might have been a
high rate of spread under these crowded and poorly ventilated circumstances.
The contrast in the observations in Building 125 and those of the Common Cold
Unit among British Antarcticans prompted our subsequent "Antarctic Hut" ex-
periments, which will be described after the next section.
An Experiment at McMurdo Station t Antarctica in the Interruption of Respira-
tory Virus Transmission
We did not carry on surveillance in Antarctica during 1978; instead, we worked
with the S.C. Johnson Company of Racine, Wisconsin (Johnson's Wax) to develop
a virucidal facial tissue which would be at least suitable for experimental
virus-interruption purposes in a small population such as that at McMurdo
during Winfly. They devised a quite satisfactory product which was lightly
perfumed and dark brown in color. The tissues wereactually made through the
remodeling of some rooms in the S.C. Johnson plant in Auckland, New Zealand.
The only real disadvantage to these tissues was that the iodine would sublime
within a few hours, so about a dozen tissues were sealed in literally thou-
sands of clear plastic containers. The tissues were all ready for an inter-
ruption trial in Winfly 1979.
Extensive orientation of the personnel for the Winfly 1979 trial was carried
out. I flew down just before the base was closed for the winter and told the
1979 WO personnel of our plans and enlisted the help of the WO physician.
During the six months overwintering stint, our laboratory had regular conver-
sations with members of the WO party. Before Winfly 1979, the summer person-
nel were also thoroughly informed. We gave several talks at Port Hueneme, at
Christchurch and at McMurdo. Accordingly, the entire population understood (I
think!) what we were trying to do and how we were going to do it.
Slide 26 - Handin_ out the virucidal tissues ("Killer Kleenexes") in the chow
line. Mr. David Breshnahanj the NSF representative at McMurdo_ receives his
tissues eagerly. Each day in the chow line we handed out packets of tissues
to all persons dining in the Building 155 mess and, as well, distributed
larger packets at strategic places over the base. (Each morning, a couple of
people from our group loaded the bed of a truck with large tissue packets and
picked up the day-old packets all over the base and left new ones. It was a
very cold "paper route.") The tissues were supposed to be used systemat-
ically every hour for clearing the nasal passages and wiping the hands and
face. This was a voluntary effort, but the individuals were urged on by their
superiors in Holmes and Narver or in the Navy. Those individuals who had
respiratory disease used only the iodine tissues for nasal sanitation,
covering coughs and sneezes, and wiping the hands and face.
Slide 27 - The epidemic curve for the population of 233 men during Winfly,
1979. We permitted the usual outbreak to begin and respiratory illness
proceeded until September I0 at a normal, or slightly above normal, incidence
of infection. At the evening meal of September i0, we began to hand out the
tissues as described in the previous paragraph. In the days immediately
thereafter there was actually a little rise in incidence for two or three days
after the tissues were given out (incubation period?) and then a sharp
diminution of both incidence and prevalence occurred. The incidence per day
was 4.3 through September 15 and 1.7 for the remainder of Winfly; the dif-
ference was highly significant (X2 = 33, P = < 0.001).
Slide 28 - Incidence and prevalence of respiratory disease in 69 WO 1979
personnel. The drop in incidence and prevalence was especially marked in the
WO personnel, particularly when compared with a normal Winfly curve for the WO
personnel as is depicted on the next slide.
Slide 29 - Normal WO epidemic curve (Winfly 1976). The WO personnel "catch"
their colds from the newly arrived summer personnel and the incidence and
prevalence curves slowly rise until a steady state is reached in mid-Septem-
ber. The precipitous drop in Winfly 1979 is decidedly abberant (slide 28).
This was an historically controlled interruption trial, with all the frailties
such trials are subject to. Although the decrease in respiratory illness was
significant, obvious and sharp, the controls were the normal year s of 1975,
1976 and 1977. You have seen the latter two years; the curve for 1975 was
similar. Nonetheiess, the events of 1979 could have just been a normal
epidemic curve of the particular viruses present that year which were Influen-
za B, several parainfluenza viruses and some rhinoviruses - not exactly a pure
cultureE We, nor any of our consultants, could devise a way in which the 1979
Winfly population itself could be split into control and test groups. The
difficulty rested in that the purpose of the experiment could only be to stop
basewide cold transmission, done by smothering the viruses in those pers6ns
ill using the virucldal tissues for that purpose. W%en smothered and killed
at the source, the viruses could not infect another individual. If we had
split the population in half and used placebo and test tissues, all that could
have occurred would have been a halving of the number of people on base who
would have been smothering their colds. Only when individuals are protectin_
themselves is a control group possible in a single population. In theory, we
could have arranged somehow an isolation of two populations at McMurdo, but
that would have been nearly impossible, and, also, different viruses would
almost surely have circulated in each population.
If the sharply diminishing disease rates in 1979 are genuinely a result of
virucidal tissue use, almost surely this was due to the presence of influenza
virus in the population. It got everyb0dyi_ attention! We identified
influenza in the population shortly after beginning the tissue handouts and
realized full well the potential disaster which faced us in this closed
population. The medical officer for that year and the base commander called a
meeting of all supervisory personnel, and the medical officer and I explained
the circumstances. The only available method for stanching this possible
influenza epidemic was careful and thorough use of the virucidal tissues.
Accordingly, their use was made mandatory and a bulletin so stating was
issued. Everyone at McMurdo understood the possible serious outcome of wide-
spread influenza, and use of the tissues became epidemic! The Executive
Meeting occurred and the all-hands memorandum was issued, if I recall correct-
ly, on September 13, and in a couple of days, the number of new cases entering
9the dispensary dropped markedly. The diminution was even greater than
depicted in the slides, as the data in the figures represent date of onset,
not date of dispensary admission. The latter was a couple of days later than
the time of onset. It becameextremely apparent around September 17 that
influenza was falling rapidly, and the tissues received the credit whether
deserved or not. To those of us at McMurdoduring this time, the sudden
diminution of serious illness did seemlike something of a miracle. In
gratitude, and with considerable humor, plaques and medals were madefor our
group and were presented, as a complete surprise, at the base-wide award
ceremonyat the end of Winfly. I considered bringing these mementosto our
October 11-12 meeting, as the citations were so clever and humorous. There
was no little mutual gratitude involved; our group wasmost grateful to the
base personnel for taking the_roblem seriously and pursuing the appropriate
preventive measure so assiduously. Likewise, I believe the McMurdo personnel
may have been somewhat grateful to us for possibly aborting an outbreak of
serious and potentially fatal illness. Mavb.___ewe did!
When we returned to Wisconsin from McMurdo, we reported our results to S.C.
Johnson in Racine, and also to Kimberly-Clark, the makers of Kleenex tissue
and other similar products. The two companies and the University of Wisconsin
began negotiations to develop a practical version of the "Killer Kleenex."
We had sufficient tissues remaining to perform another experiment in Winfly
1980. However, in 1980 we had great difficulties in arranging for good
orientation sessions of the new men, and we did not have the help of an
influenza epidemic. We did achieve considerable diminution of disease, but
the curve was nothing like 1979. One of the reasons for difficulties in
Winfly 1980 is the outbreak depicted on the next slide.
Slide 30 - A shard outbreak of cold-like illnesses at Scott Base during mid-
Winfly. As most of you know, Scott Base is around 2-i/2 miles down the road
from the much larger American base at McMurdo. The New Zealanders at Scott
Base and the Americans at McMurdo had much contact with one another, par-
ticulary on a social basis. Actually, during our years in Antarctica, we
carried on epidemiologic studies at Scott Base along with those at McMurdo,
and found that very little illness occurred at Scott Base during Winfly, and
we never found McMurdo viruses at Scott Base. Typical is the complete absence
of illness at Scott Base during the first couple of weeks of 1980. However,
coincident with an end-of-season WO party at Scott Base, was a very substan-
tial outbreak of illness involving eleven of the twelve residents. The
circumstances of this outbreak were unusual. The main entertainment at the
party was an excellent American orchestra from McMurdo. The leader, who was
also the major vocalist and a saxophonist, had a severe cold, as did a couple
of his sidemen. While the index case for this sharp outbreak occurred the day
prior to the WO party, it seems very likely that the major source of the
outbreak was the vibrating larynx of the band leader with the severe cold.
(Frustratingly, we have been unable to establish the etiology of this out-
break, even though excellent specimens were furnished by all those ill and
were placed in cell culture on the same day. We have not as yet, however,
tried serodiagnosis of viruses which will not propagate in cell culture, such
as the coronaviruses.) There are a couple of other similar outbreaks recorded
in the scientific literature, one in which a band leader disseminated rubella
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to his audience in Honolulu (Marks et al. Saturday Night Fever: A common-
source outbreak of rubella among adults in Hawaii. Am J Epidemiol 114:574-83
[1981]) and the other in an airplane at Homer, Alaska where a single in-
dividual with severe influenza disseminated her illness to 72Z of her fellow
passengers (Moser, et al. An outbreak of influenza aboard a commercial
airliner. Am J Epidemiol, 110:1-6 [1979]). These three outbreaks demonstrate
rather clearly the environment in which rapid dissemination of respiratory
illnesses can occur either on earth or within a space capsule or a planetary
colony.
Development of the Antarctic Hut Transmission Model
As stated above, upon our return from Antarctica in 1980, negotiations were
resumed with Johnson's Wax and Kimberly-Clark. I talked to the executives and
scientific personnel of the two companies, bringing them up to date on our
1980 results which weren't all that good. They were not, however, deterred at
all. At this time, the theoretical method for respiratory virus transmission
probably had a great deal to do with their eagerness. As a result of some
work in the late 1970's from the University of Virginia, it seemed that the
most likely way of transmission, at least of rhinovirus infections, was
through hand contact. If this were so, a virucidal tissue should very
effectively stop transmission. In actuality, the evidence was really not all
that good, and I did try to point this out to the assemblage.
Notwithstanding my cautionary remarks, we began immediately the quest for a
more practical virucidal facial tissue and a population in which to test it.
At our first working meeting, the Kimberly-Clark chief chemist, Dr. Shall
Hussein, suggested that we try citric acid as a virucide to take advantage of
most respiratory viruses' sensitivity to acid and of the capacity of citric
acid to stick to wood fibers. We promptly tried this in our laboratory and
found it to be excellent; one square inch of citric acid-treated tissue
destroyed one million rhinoviruses in less than one minute. Subsequently,
sodium lauryl sulfate and malic acid were added to deal more effectively with
the enveloped viruses. The resultant facial tissue was completely non-toxic,
highly virucidal, stable and did not impart any color to the fiber base.
We then discussed the population in which to test the effectiveness of the
tissue. My experience with a variety of populations made me highly skeptical
of testing the tissue in this trial phase in any population which could not be
nearly completely controlled. I suggested that we try to create a human
volunteer transmission model using the knowledge gleaned in Antarctica by both
the British and ourselves. Dr. Hussein and his colleages decided on the
latter course and we began promptly. Our first experiment was only partially
successful but our second succeeded beyond our wildest dreams. We placed five
to ten men whom we had infected with Rhlnovirus type 16 (donors) together with
five other men who had no antibody to this virus (recipients) together in a
single room for seven days, and all five susceptible persons were infected -
as were four of seven individuals who were monitoring the experiment! These
monitors were in the study unit approximately four hours per day. We did four
confirmatory experiments to set the conditions necessary for the most effi-
cient test of the virucidal tissues. These five experiments were placed
together in a 1984 "model" publication which is enclosed (Reprint #4),
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together with another volunteer paper of ours which was published simul-
taneously as a twin (Reprint #5) in the Journal of Infectious Diseases. These
two papers were published together with two others which described unsuccess-
ful efforts with interferon as an anti-rhinovirus drug. Accompanying these
four papers was a Perspective written by Dr. Robert B. Couch, one of the
editors for the Journal of Infectious Diseases and a long-time worker with
various respiratory viruses. He discussed these four papers and others in the
Perspective, including ours under a section entitled Environmental Control? on
p. 170 of the accompanying reprint (Reprint #6). The essence of the five
experiments in our "Model" paper (Reprint @5) is illustrated on slide 31.
Slide 31 - Relationship between the number of hours to which each recipient
was exposed to one or more donors and his probability of becomin_ infected.
Rather amazingly there was a _irect straight line relationship between the
amount of time a recipient was exposed to an infected donor and his probabili-
ty of becoming infected. One Donor Hour of Exposure (DHE) is the exposure of
one or more recipients to a single donor for one hour. If the recipient is
exposed to two donors for one hour this is two DHE; if he is exposed to two
donors for ten hours, this is twenty DHE. The rate of transmission, within
reason, seems not to depend upon the number of recipients but upon the number
of donors in the room.
We wished to work out an arrangement whereby it was possible for about 50% of
the recipients to become infected and wished to do that in the shortest period
of time possible, preferably one day. You will note by interpolation on the
graph that this requires approximately 200 (DHE). This would have taken more
than one day, as our eight donors over twelve hours would yield only 96 DHE.
We then decided to change the volunteer arrangement in the model to permit
more intensive exposure and hoped to get 50% transmission within one 12-hour
day. We settled on an intensive exposure via a continuous 12-hour poker game
(with lunch breaks) with eight donors and twelve recipients in the experiment
room. This arrangement is demonstrated on Slide 32.
Slide 32 - The 12-hour poker game (Antarctic Hut) transmission model. The
reader will note that there are four tables, each with two donors and three
recipients seated around the periphery. At one end of the room is located a
monitor's table where all the activities and signs of colds are recorded by
two graduate students. These two individuals plus other members of our
research team continuously observe operations. We selected low-stakes poker
as our major interaction vehicle for four reasons: (i) By using cards and
poker chips, there was a continuous shuffle of objects, potentially filled
with rhinoviruses, to the various people around the table. (2) The character
of the game caused somewhat boisterous behavior. (3) The face-to-face
arrangement of the volunteers provided a good opportunity for airborne
transmission. (4) At least in its basic elements, poker is a fairly easy game
to learn, and it is sufficiently compelling - even with nickel and dime bets
to be played for many hours.
Slides 33 and 34 - View of the interaction room throuKh the lens of a video
camera. This is a typical poker game with the monitors taking down all
movements and signs of illness. Note the happy, rather excited demeanor of
the young experimenters.
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As soon as we decided upon this 12-hour model, it was tested, and we obtained
a 42%transmission rate in the first trial. Quite naturally, Kimberly-Clark
was anxious for us to test their new virucidal facial tissues in this model,
which we did. Wegot no transmission at all[ This was quite astonishing to
us and is depicted on the next slide.
Slide 35 - Complete interruption of RVI6 transmissions by a vlrucldal tissue.
This delineates the overall results of four sequential trials of the virucidal
tissues as compared with cotton handkerchiefs. The third experiment attained
exactly the same result as the second, zero transmission, and the fourth
experiment achieved a 75% transmission rate. (The interruption experiment is
described in enclosed in Reprint @7.) For good reason, Kimberly-Clark was
ecstatic, as were we, and the['immediately began to manufacture the facial
tissues for test market under the trade name AVERT. Unfortunately, probably
because they were very expensive, the test markets were unsuccessful. After
considerable internal debate, the AVERT project has been put on hold and we
have about 10,000 boxes on campus. We hope that these can be used in the
future to define their role in preventing infections under various experimen-
tal and natural circumstances. Note that we don't know whether the AVERT
tissues were better than regular tissues; we know only that vlrucidal tissues
stopped RVI6 transmission among poker-playlng male UW students.
Mechanisms of RVI6 Transmission Experiments
We carried out four final Antarctic Hut experimfn_s in this serie s in order to
delineate the mechanism of transmission. As indicated in the above para-
graphs, the prevailing view was that colds were primarily transmitted by
direct contact. It seemed likely to us that we should be able to settle this
issue by some careful Antarctic Hut experiments.
Slide 36 - Four experiments to determine how Rhinovirus 16 is transmitted.
Experiments A, B and C were typical 12-hour, 8 donor, 12 recipient poker game
experiments, but, in each, six of the 12 recipients wore either a large collar
or an arm brace which prevented them from touching their hands to their faces.
(See Reprint #8.) This stopped hand transmission as a possible route. The
other six individuals could pick their noses, rub their eyes or do whatever
they wished. The collars and braces were designed so as not to interfere with
poker playing. You will note on this slide that in Experiments A, B and C the
transmission rates varied from 42Z to 92Z, and, overall, the restrained
recipients had a 56Z attack rate and the unrestrained (control) recipients had
a 67Z attack rate. The difference between 67Z and 56Z was not significant.
The results of Experiments A,B and C suggest that eliminating hand-to-face
contact did not impede transmission from the donors to the recipients.
Experiment D was really an extension of Experiment C. Our 12-hour experiments
usually end at around 11:00 or 12:00 PH. At the end of Experiment C, 12
additional recipients were placed immediately in an identical room across the
hall from the interaction room used for Experiments A,B and C. Into the room
with these 12 new recipients were placed all the tables, chairs, poker chips,
pencils, cards, etc. used in Experiment C. As it turned out, the transmis-
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sion rate in Experiment C was 42%, so it is known that these donors had,
somehow, transmitted their colds to the Experiment C recipients. These
transferred fomites had been handled for 12 hours by eight men with fairly
severe colds. The new recipients, whom we called "fomite recipients" began to
play poker with this very decidedly "used" equipment. At first, they were
reluctant even to handle the cards, but we patiently explained again the
purpose of the experiment and persuaded them to touch their hands to their
nostrils and eyes every 15 minutes to assure good hand-to-nostril contact.
After a little reluctance the fomite recipients entered into their games with
vigor. Meanwhile, we began a new poker game back in the Experiment C interac-
tion room. This game, which began shortly after 12:00 midnight, contained
eight donors playing with new decks of cards, i.e., everyone in the game had a
"good" RVI6 cold. Each hour the cards, poker chips, pencils and other easily
transported items were inter6h_nged between the donor poker game and the
fomite recipient poker game. Thus, the fomite recipients had an hourly supply
of freshly contaminated fomites. Both games continued for 12 hours. The
reader will note that half the cards used by the Experiment D (fomite)
recipients had been used by eight sick donors for 18 hours.
Much to our amazement, none of the fomite recipients shed rhinovirus type 16
nor did they develop any symptoms. Obviously, the fomites used in the fomite-
only poker room were, theoretically at least, contaminated to a far greater
extent than would ordinarily be the case. The donors' hands were cultured for
RVI6 in Experiment D and the recipients' were cultured in Experiments C and D.
No virus was recovered from the recipients' hands, and amounts from 47-1600
TCID 50 were recovered from the Experiment D donors.
The reader will note that in_these four experiments, we blocked hand transmis-
sion in Experiments A,B and C and airborne transmission in Experiment D. In
the first three experiments the collars and arm splints made hand contact
impossible, and in Experiment D interception by two brick walls made airborne
transmission _mPossible.
Slide 37 LANCET editorial on our Antarctic Hut research. The last slide is
the best of all in that it is the listing of the editorials of the February 8,
1988 edition of The Lancet. The editorial on the "splints" is directed at
this last series of experiments. As well, our other work including the
transmission model, is reviewed. The editorial was a complete surprise and is
enclosed (Reprint @9).
One additional experiment in this series was performed and is described in the
1988 publication: "Near Disappearance of Rhinovirus Along a Fomite Transmis-
sion Chain" (Reprint #I0). In this work which was chiefly performed by Dr.
Jennings and Ms. Mink, we sought to determine why, in our preceding experi-
ments, so little virus had passed by fomite from the donor's nose to the
recipient's hands. For this experiment we used a three donor/three recipient
poker game where the amount of virus in the nasal washing, on the finger tips
of the left hand and right hand, on the cards and poker chips, and on the
recipient's upper lip and external nares, was determined. The three donors
entered the experiment with approximately i million tissue culture infective
doses per ml of nasal washing, and they deposited from 320-32,000 TCID50:s of
RVI6 on the finger tips of their left and right hands. On the cards and chips
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(the fomites) the amount of virus was very small, none in approximately i/3 of
the cases and was usually no higher than 32 TCID50 per fomite. By the time
the virus got to the three recipients, the great majority of samples from the
right and left hands as well as the upper lip and external nares were negative
(14 of 18 samples). Of the four that were positive, two of them had 13 TCID50
and two I00 TCID50. (These data can be found on Table 2 of Reprint _I0).
We did find that when mucus was wet on any fomite that the virus was easily
transmitted to a recipient's hand. Evidently, in our poker games there is
very little wet mucus left, despite gross initial contamination. This "Near
Disappearance..." paper was selected for connnent by one of the co-editors, Dr.
Mark S. Klempner, in the 1990 Yearbook of Infectious Diseases (pp. 128-29).
The reader will enjoy Dr. Klempner's remarks! (Reprint [#ii])
We are now embarked on an investigation with the American Filtrona Corporation
to determine whether their new high capacity, fine pore filters will remove
rhinoviruses from the air. If so, we shall try to stop transmission by
filtering the air.
CONCLUSIONS
These many pages, figures and reprints have covered many years of research in
open populations such as families and school rooms, in an isolated Antarctic
station and, finally, in a series of human volunteer experiments based on the
prior epidemiologic investigations. We have found that a variety of different
viruses spread slowly among the various populations and in the volunteer
groups. Using a virucidal tissue, we have been able to completely stop
rhinovirus 16 transmission in volunteers, and possibly greatly impede virus
transmission in an Antarctic population. We have also presented evidence that
most rhinovirus transmission is through aerosolized particles. We hope that
we are on the threshold of effectively blocking transmission through the air
through the filtering capacity of high technology filter units. Perhaps a
combination of air filtration and careful nasal sanitation with virucidal
tissues will effectively control virus transmission in isolated space colonies
and in ordinary earth-bound populations.
Slide i - The respiratory
viruses.
Slide 2 - Epidemic curve of
viruses in a 25-
family population.
Slide 3 - Respiratory viruses
in a sin$1e Ea$1e
Heights building.
Slide 4 - Antarctic research
seasons at McMurdo.
Slide 5 - Map of McMurdo
Station.
Slide 18 - The evening meal
at the Buildin$
155 mess hall.
Slide 19 - The mess line at
the Building 155
dining facility.
Slide 20 - Dr. Adrian Mande!
interviewing a
Navy man in the
Building 155
mess line.




Slide 22 - Epidemic curve
_during Winfly, 1977.
Slide 23 - Building 137L
a small dormitory.
Slide 24 - Rate of colds and




Slide 28 - Incidence and preva-
lenc_ of respiratory
disease in 69 WO
1979 personnel.
Slide 29 - Normal W0 epidemic
curve (Winfly 1976).
Slide 30 - A sharp outbreak of
cold-like illnesses
at Scott Base during
mid-Winfly.
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Slide 32 - The 12-hour poker
game _Antarctic Hut)
transmission model.
Slides 33 & 34 -
View of the inter-
action room through
the lens of a video
camera.
Slide 34 - same as #33
Slide 35 - Complete interrup-
tion of RVI6 trans-
missions by a
virucidal tissue.
Slide 36 - Four experiments
to determine how
RVI6 is transmitted.











WINFLY Start 8/23 8/26 8/22 8/22 8/20 8/26 8/22 8/22
Mainbody
Opening 10/5 10/3 10/3 10/4 i0/I 10/4 10/4 10/3
Closeout 2/23 2/19 2/20 2/28 2/25 2/27 2/25 2/26
139 140 147 147 146 144 146
Dental Visits 733 558 449 638
Dental Procedure 2747 3586 3555 4568
444 500 618
2974 2868 3621
Patient Visits 2795 2321 2040 2431 2582 2821 2498 2997
Lab Procedures 1553 949 1621 1254 921 2895 627 763
Radiographs 666 645 535 632 551 925 539 613
Prescriptions 2655 1171 1303 1538 2520 1766 2509 2213
Minor Surgery - 29 22 28 0 58 36 26
Accldent/Injury 261 246 - 241 360 261 299 237
Ethanol Related 21 16 - 19 18 15 19 15
Cold Injury - i0 6 7 9 4 2 2
MVA Related - - - 2 5 16 2 I
Ward Admissions 66 II 13 20 17 18 18 35
Sick Days - - - 186 234 473 258 213
Medevacs 16 18 20 14 16 6 12 12
Consultations - - - 22 23 17 7 29
Fatalities 1 0 0 1 2 3 1 0
Cateaorv 82-_ 83-4 84-5 85-6 _-7 _7-$ _$-_ $9-90





MCMURDO - EIGHT YEAR SUMMER EXPERIENCE
ACCIDENT RELATED MEDEVACS/CONSULTATION_
Fractures/Dislocations
































































































































Complete History and Physical
Dental Exam with Bite Wings
CBC, UA, RPR
Blood Type and Rh Factor
CXR PA & Lateral (every 5 years)
ECG 12-1ead (baseline, annually after age 40)
Lipid Panel (annually over age 35)
Intraocular Pressure (annually over age 40)
PAP Smear (annually for women)
Chemistry Panel (if on diuretics)







MCMURDO MEDICAL CAPABILITIES - LABORATORY





Chemistry - Electrolytes, BUN, Creatinine
Ca, Mg, P
AST, ALT, CK, LDH, Alk Phos, TBR
Amylase, Uric Acid
Theophylline







Micro - Aerobic & Anaerobic bacterial C&S
Gram Stain, KOH
MCMURDO MEDICAL CAPABILITIES
Radiology - All routine radiographs
IVP
Surgery - OR with standard major/minor
instrument trays
Monitors - ECG 12-1ead
ECG Monitors/Defibrillators
Pulse Oximeter
Dental - Fully equipped operatory








University of California -
Davis, California 95616
Davis
THE RUMAN EXPERIENCE IN ANTARCTICA
Involve Operational Personnel and Researchers
Apply Contemporary Theories and Methods










Dimensions of Complex Environments
Station Culture





Absorption: Imperviousness to Distraction
Imaginative Involvement: Creativity and Fantasy
Task Moderators





Control Mechansisms ("Fear Control")
iii
l II II II
Historical Determinants (LSQ)
Chronic Environmental Factors - Isolation, Confinement
Acute Situational Factors - Weather, Workload, Events
Personality Moderators and the Experience of Stress
Objective Stress Control Mechanisms ("Threat Control")
AUTOMATION
Perceived Control: Who (What's) In Charge Here?
Allocation of Tasks to Persons and Machines
Transparency





Crew Coordination - Cockpit Resource Management
Group Decisions: "Groupthink" and Extremity
Intergroup Conflict and "Microaggressions"


















Use of PCs for Data Collection
Telemetry
ANTARCTTC/SPACE ANALOGUES
Surface Ships ("ENDEAVOR 1,000")
Nuclear Submarines
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